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Should the law interfere with individual choices and actions that cause 
no harm to others but that are regarded as wrong?  Is it permissible for the
law to restrain individual freedom not for the sake of preventing harm
to others but in order to prevent people from performing immoral deeds
or from debasing or harming themselves?  Doubtless that is the purpose
of some laws, although it is not always easy to tell which and to what
extent, since most laws pursue, or can be interpreted to pursue, a variety of
goals.  Standard examples of moralist legislation, such as the criminalization
of bigamy, and of paternalist legislation, such as bans on the sale of body
parts, may with more or less ingenuity be construed as measures taken
to prevent harm to others.  It seems indeed that it is not so easy to isolate
obvious cases of laws uniquely infused with moralist or paternalist concerns.1 
But neither is it impossible.  In two of its most famous decisions—Bowers 
v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas—the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of whether laws in Georgia and in Texas punishing acts 
of sodomy or “deviant sexual intercourse” taken in private by consenting 
adults, particularly in the case of Texas by adults of the same sex, are 
* © 2017 Conçalo Almeida Ribeiro.  Católica Global School of Law and Católica 
Research Centre for the Future of Law (Lisbon). LL.M., S.J.D., Harvard Law School. 
Email: gar@ucp.pt. I am grateful to Chris Wonnell, Doug Husak, Jorge Pereira da Silva, 
Larry Alexander, Luís Pereira Coutinho, Michael Moore, Miguel Nogueira de Brito, Rui 
Medeiros, Steven Smith, and Pedro Múrias for their comments on an earlier draft.  All 
errors are mine. 
1. On the distinction between moralist and paternalist concerns, which is of little 
relevance to my argument, see H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 4–6, 30–34 
(1963). 
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compatible with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, where it provides that “nor shall any State
deprive any person of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law.”2  I suppose 
the criminalization of sodomy is a good example of unambiguously
moralist or paternalist legislation—indeed, it is often both of these at once, 
since the most common justification offered for such laws is that they
enforce the conviction of a majority of the community that sodomy is 
immoral and that they prevent people from using their sexuality in a way 
that is unnatural, undignified, and corrupt.
It does not follow, of course, that legal moralists, the people who believe
the law may be legitimately used to enforce morality or prevent harm to 
oneself, must support these laws.  They may well oppose them on various
grounds, ranging from concerns about privacy and liberty to considerations 
of expediency and prudence.3  Distinctive about their position is the fact
that they take stock of moralist and paternalist reasons in their musings over 
the propriety of these and indeed any laws.  In a nutshell, their standpoint is
that immorality and harm to oneself are valid reasons, though perhaps not
always or even ordinarily definitive reasons, for the law to restrain
individual freedom. 
The most notorious and eloquent critic of that view is John Stuart Mill, who 
set out to defend in his essay On Liberty “one very simple principle . . . to
govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual,” a principle 
that came to be labelled “the harm principle” (HP).4 It is worth quoting 
his opening statement of the principle at length:
That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is
self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He 
cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him
to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to
2. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 562 (2003); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
3. See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS, at v (1965) (“[I]t is the
duty of society, if it can, to save any youth from being led into . . . [homosexuality] . . . 
although it may mean much suffering by incurable perverts who seem unable to resist the 
corruption of boys. But if there is no danger of corruption, I do not think that there is any
good the law can do that outweighs the misery that exposure and imprisonment causes to
addicts who cannot find satisfaction in any other way of life.”).  The view that the 
enforcement of morality should be subject to a judgment balancing moralist reasons with 
countervailing concerns can be traced back at least as far as 1 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA PART I–II, at 1017–18 (First Am. ed., Fathers of English Dominican Province 
trans., 1947) (1485). 
4. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 13–14 (John Gray ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1859). 
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do so would be wise, or even right . . . To justify that, the conduct from which it 
is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to someone else.  The 
only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that 
which concerns others.  In the part which merely concerns himself, his 
independence is, of right, absolute.  Over himself, over his own body and mind, 
the individual is sovereign.5 
Notice that the HP, as stated by Mill, contains two distinct propositions that
might be termed the “positive principle” and the “negative principle.”  The
positive principle concerns the assertion that there are good grounds— albeit,
as we shall see later, only prima facie good grounds—to restrain
individual freedom in order to prevent harm to others.  The negative principle 
establishes that it is wrong to restrain individual freedom for moralist or 
paternalist reasons. It is this latter proposition, the core claim of Mill’s
essay and the focus of the longstanding debate triggered by it that shall
concern us; according to this core negative variant, the case for the HP is 
really but a case against legal moralism.6 
Mill’s target is not only legal moralism but social moralism at large.  He
argues with equal vigor for individual freedom and against “compulsion and
control . . . whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal
penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion.”7  By the latter he means 
the pressure felt by individuals “under the eye of a dreaded and hostile 
censorship” to conform to the prevailing social norms and the accepted
lifestyles of the community, what he calls “the despotism of custom.”8 
His subject is not the grounds and limits of legal restraints on individual 
freedom, nor even the broader issue of limited government, but the border
separating the “sovereignty of the individual” from the “authority of
society” in both its organized and diffuse incarnations.9  Although there is
much to be said for this broad treatment of the matter, I shall confine my
attention to the narrower point of whether the HP should be accepted as a 
criterion to define the proper scope of the law. 
The issue is often framed even more narrowly, reflecting what we might
call a “criminalist bias.”  It is presented as a question about whether acts that
are self-regarding, in that they cause no harm to others, may be subject to
punishment.  It is true that most of the debated examples of moralist and 
5. Id. at 14. 
6.  I am grateful to Michael Moore for pressing me to be clear on this point. 
7. MILL, supra note 4, at 14.
 8. Id. at 68, 78. 
9. Id. at 83. 
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paternalist legislation are taken from the field of criminal law, presumably
not only because that is the area where the consequences of legal interference 
with individual freedom are more salient and dramatic but also because even
the most stringent legal moralists concede that an act must have a vicious
character or self-destructive consequences to justify legal proscription.  Once 
that threshold is met, it seems quite appropriate to regard the matter as 
criminal in nature. 
And yet the HP reaches way beyond the realm of crime and punishment. 
For starters, it encompasses not just criminal prohibitions—acts that are
regarded as felonies or misdemeanors, and are accordingly met with
punishment—but any form of legal proscription of self-regarding behavior,
including infractions but also regulations that ban the supply of substance –– 
e.g., alcohol––or services––e.g., paid sex––the consumption of which is
deemed immoral or harmful to oneself.  The HP targets as well positive duties 
to perform certain kinds of self-regarding acts, such as participating in
religious festivities or giving money––in the form of taxes––to a charity, and
the refusal of the law to enforce promises and agreements on account of 
their wicked or degrading nature, such as the sale of body parts or surrogacy
agreements.  The law may also encumber without going as far as interdicting 
activity considered undesirable—say, taxing the consumption of certain 
kinds of goods or requiring burdensome formalities for the enforcement
of certain types of agreement.10  Legal moralism may hence be pursued
through all manner of laws—not just criminal but also tax, contract, family, 
regulatory, and other laws—and with varying degrees of compulsion, ranging 
from punishment to steering or as little as nudging self-regarding behavior.11 
The diversity of means should not, however, distract us from the two
shared features of legal moralism in any of its forms: it is governed by
moralist or paternalist reasons and it ultimately involves coercion at some 
point, be it directly––against the recalcitrance of the agent whose behavior
is the concern of the law––or indirectly––against those who supply such agent 
with undesirable stuff––and positively––punishing offenses or enforcing commands 
10. Mill equivocates on this point. See id. at 111–12.  He claims that indirect 
taxation aimed at increasing public revenue but subsidiarily set to discourage undesirable 
—albeit socially harmless—activity is permissible under the HP. Id. He writes that “it 
must be remembered that taxation for fiscal purposes is absolutely inevitable . . . [that] it
is hence the duty of the state to consider, in the imposition of taxes, what commodities the 
consumers can best spare; and a fortiori, to select in preference those of which it deems
the use, beyond a very moderate quantity, to be positively injurious.”  Id. at 112.  The 
argument is disingenuous and incoherent with the basis thesis of the essay, since indirect 
taxation does not have to target specific goods and the HP requires that the government
refrains from deciding which goods are desirable and in what amounts. Id. at 111–12. 
11. See generally DEVLIN, supra note 3 (devoting chapters to the role of morals in 
various branches of the law, including: criminal, tort, contract, and family).
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––or negatively––refusing to enforce unlawful agreements. Such features mark
out the boundaries of the subject. 
II. 
Why should the HP be accepted?  It is tempting to argue that the basis 
of the principle is political neutrality, the idea that the government should 
remain neutral regarding the rich diversity of conceptions of the good life 
held and practiced by the citizenry.  Many persons hold views, more or 
less explicit and more or less examined, about the proper way to lead their
lives.  The full range of considerations that fall under that domain has been
called for a long time, at least since the days of Socrates, ethics or the 
knowledge of what it is—and how to—live well.  In the tradition of post-
Enlightenment culture, particularly romantic and existentialist, which 
largely grew in rebellion against the view that one can know how to live 
well, the ancient concept of ethics has become more and more foreign to 
popular conceptions of value, and its place was taken by the notion of a
quest for the meaning of life, sometimes in the form of discovering, sometimes
as the process of creating, the meaning of our lives, and occasionally
as a request that we recognize that life is meaningless.  What all such views, 
about living well and the meaning of life, have in common, is that they 
concern our ultimate ends or conceptions of the good. 
It is clear not only that there are many rival conceptions of the good but
that each of those conceptions characteristically draws, not always explicitly, 
on a wide range of metaphysical and epistemological premises and
arguments, the truth and validity of which are contentious matters as well.
In a word, conceptions of the good are often formed, developed, and re­
examined in the light afforded by what John Rawls calls “comprehensive 
doctrines,” or what are ordinarily called worldviews.12  Neutrality is the
view that it is not the business of political authority and of the laws it
enacts and enforces to take sides in the dispute among the citizens as to 
what makes a life worth living or what worldview is correct.  As Joseph 
Raz put it: “governments must so conduct themselves that their actions 
will neither improve nor hinder the chances individuals have of living in 
accord with their conception of the good.”13
 12. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM at xviii, 12–13 (1993). 
13. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 108 (1986). 
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The HP seems to follow quite straightforwardly from the concept of 
political neutrality.  If the government is not to act on the basis of any
comprehensive doctrine or conception of the good, the law should not
interfere with individual choices where these have no harmful effects on 
others. Any such interference is inevitably informed by notions of the
rightness and goodness of human action that furnish illegitimate grounds 
for political decisions; the HP is thus one, though not the only one, and
perhaps the most significant of the practical corollaries of neutrality. 
But arguing for the HP from political neutrality is an enterprise doomed
to failure, even if we brush aside the unsettling ambiguities of that notion.14 
It merely transfers the burden of justification from the HP to neutrality
itself. And it is not by any means obvious why the law should be neutral 
on so-called comprehensive matters or regarding rival conceptions of the
good. It is true, of course, that liberals tend to find the ideal of neutrality 
extremely important and seductive; nonetheless, there is a lot of work to 
be put into the task of justifying such importance and to make sense of 
such seduction, and asserting dogmatically the concept of neutrality does 
not contribute to it any more than asserting dogmatically the HP.  That
there is close affinity between the HP and the ideal of neutrality is undeniable, 
but the latter is hardly explanatory of what makes the former compelling. 
The most attractive candidate to serve as a ground for neutrality—the 
principle of equal respect―does not quite justify it in the full extent
required to support the HP.  We might hold that what makes neutrality
necessary is the duty to treat all persons with equal respect coupled with
what Rawls calls “the fact of reasonable pluralism.”15  It is the case that 
what we have in our societies is not just a diversity of worldviews and 
conceptions of the good; the disagreement among the various contenders 
is reasonable, since none is able to make a case for the view it holds such 
that the opponents are rationally bound to embrace it.  Each view in contest 
has to be regarded neither as unreasonable nor as true, but as respectable
and possibly true.  But not all self-regarding agency is based on reasonable 
or respectable conceptions of the good, and sometimes it is not even
reflective of any such conception. Most liberals have not given this point the
importance it merits.  After asking “[w]hat does it mean for the government
to treat its citizens as equals?”  Ronald Dworkin spells out the liberal view: 
14. Id. at 110–33. 
15. See RAWLS, supra note 12, at 36–38; see also JOSHUA COHEN, MORAL PLURALISM
AND POLITICAL CONSENSUS IN THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 270–91 (David Copp et al. eds., 
1993); Charles Larmore, The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism, 96 J. PHIL. 599, 611 
(1999). 
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[T]he . . . government must be neutral on what might be called the question of the 
good life . . . Each person follows a more-or-less articulate conception of what 
gives value to life. The scholar who values a life of contemplation has such a
conception; so does the television-watching, beer-drinking citizen who is fond of
saying “This is life,” though he has thought less about the issue and is less able 
to describe or defend his conception . . . The [liberal] theory of equality supposes
that political decisions must be, so far as it is possible, independent of any
particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life. Since the
citizens of a society differ in their conceptions, the government does not treat 
them as equals if it prefers one conception to another, either because the officials
believe that one is intrinsically superior, or because one is held by the more 
numerous or more powerful group.16 
What Dworkin fails to explain is why the government does not treat citizens
with equal respect if it discourages unreflective practices or disregards
unreasonable preferences.  Citizens demand equal treatment of their lifestyles 
insofar as these are worthy of respect, and there is hardly anything
respectable about the choices of the television-watching, beer-drinking
citizen, and of all those who fall prey to “gambling, or drunkenness,
or incontinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness” and other “things which
have been tried and condemned from the beginning of the world.”17 The limit
that neutrality draws on political action is based on the idea that government
officials have no title to settle the ongoing dispute in society about which 
of a large number of competing worldviews is correct, but it has no
purchase on legal interference with the class of self-regarding acts that
cannot be referred to any plausible conception of the good or that proceed 
from either thoughtlessness or weakness of the will.  From the premise of
equal respect, therefore, one cannot argue for the HP in its full extent, but 
only for the freedom to perform self-regarding acts that reflect reasonable 
conceptions of the good, and more broadly for lifestyles that are reasoned 
and cohere around some intelligible and defensible plan.18 
III. 
Equal respect––coupled with the fact of reasonable pluralism––furnishes a
partial case for the HP.  I will advance other partial and only partially
overlapping grounds, and conclude that the best case that can be made for 
it is a pluralist one, in the sense that the HP is not grounded in a single reason 
16. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985).
17. MILL, supra note 4, at 89. 
18. The notion of “plans of life” is developed in JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
407–16 (1971). 
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or ground but in a broad coalition of reasons or grounds, including—apart
from the principle of equal respect—moral worth, self-government, 
experimentalism, and individualism.19 In this section of the Article, I develop 
the argument from moral worth, leaving the other three for the next section. 
Laws might regulate self-regarding conduct with the aim of enforcing 
morality by preventing people from performing wicked deeds, which seems
to be one of the purposes behind the punishment of sodomy, fornication,
bestiality, incest, adultery, homosexuality, prostitution, bigamy, and other 
types of sexual activity regarded as crimes in some jurisdictions. It is 
surely one the chief aims for punishing so-called victimless crimes, which
include at least some of those just listed.  It is fairly obvious that in many
instances objections against laws of this kind can be leveled from the 
standpoint of equal respect and reasonable pluralism, particularly when
the relevant moral judgments rely on religious premises that are hotly
disputed in the public square.  But even if we assume the existence of
a reasoned community consensus on the immorality of some of these and
other self-regarding acts, it is worth asking what exactly is achieved through 
the enforcement of morality as such.  Where exactly is the moral value in
coercing someone to do the right thing?  Do I honor my moral duty to 
donate money to a deserving charity if I do it for fear of punishment, in 
order to reap a tax benefit, or to win the approbation of my community?
The phrases “coercion into charity” or “forcing people to be good” seem
to be little more than bizarre oxymorons that, however well-meaning, will 
inevitably lead to painfully misguided policy decisions.  The observance 
of moral requirements is worthless unless it is motivated by a desire to
attain goodness and rectitude, the values towards which the moral order 
guides human beings.  H.L.A. Hart put the point ably:
[A] very great difference is apparent between inducing persons through fear of
punishment to abstain from actions which are harmful to others, and inducing
them to abstain from actions which deviate from accepted morality but harm no
one . . . [W]here there is no harm to be prevented and no potential victim to be 
19. It is important not to confuse pluralism in this sense―what we might call “justificatory­
pluralism”―with other familiar deployments of the term pluralism in practical philosophy,
namely “political pluralism” and “value pluralism.” See Elinor Mason, Value Pluralism, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 29, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/
entries/value-pluralism/ [https://perma.cc/P84Z-SNGE].  Political pluralism concerns the
existence of a plurality of worldviews in society, or the fact of reasonable pluralism.  Id.
Moral pluralism concerns the existence of a plurality of values in morality, irreducible to
some higher or master value. Id. A pluralist case for the HP does not entail moral pluralism; it
is possible that the various complementary grounds that I offer for the HP point towards a 
single master value―say, human dignity―just as it is that they form an irreducible, or 
partly irreducible, plurality of values.  What is clear, though, is that appealing to an abstract 
and contested value such as human dignity does very little to warrant our commitment
to the principle, and that is precisely what concerns us here. 
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protected, as is often the case where conventional sexual morality is disregarded,
it is difficult to understand the assertion that conformity, even if motivated merely
by fear of the law’s punishment, is a value worth pursuing . . . This does not mean
that we cannot intelligibly attribute value to lives dedicated to ideals of chastity
or self-denial . . . But what is valuable here is voluntary restraint, not submission 
to coercion, which seems quite empty of moral value.20 
Hart seems surprisingly oblivious to the fact that we owe Immanuel 
Kant the most elaborate version of that claim, and it is worth examining it 
in some detail.  According to Kant, action in conformity with duty is merely
legal action, devoid of any moral value; only action from duty, prompted
by the “ethical incentive” of respect for morality and its demands upon 
rational agency, is a source of moral value.21  It is hence in the nature of
morality that it cannot be enforced. 
The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals proceeds from the 
assertion that nothing in the world “could be considered good without
limitation except a good will.”22  Good is an appraisive concept that we
use to judge all sorts of things—“Peter is a good piano player” or “this 
medicine is good for headaches”—but there is something conditional or 
relative about most such uses.  To be a good piano player is to be good 
ator relative toa certain activity and a good medicine is good to 
relieve pain or cure an illness. One indication of the merely conditional 
worth of these things is that there is a range of synonyms for the word
‘good’ in the examplesdexterity or adroitness, in the first example, and
suitable or fit, in the second. Even things that are ordinarily taken to be 
good for their own sakesuch as health and happinessare not
unconditionally good; for instance, a sadistic torturer may be quite happy.
According to Kant, the only thing in the world that is unconditionally or 
absolutely good is a good will. 
To say that the only unqualified good in the world is a good will is 
evidently not a definition of “goodness” or moral value, since the phrase 
“good will” repeats the term that requires definition.  Kant is concerned
at this stage not with the content but with the object of moral value, that 
is to say, with the things of which it is appropriate to say that they either 
have or lack unconditional goodness.  His claim is that good in that sense 
is a predicate of the will, a proposition that has a series of negative 
20. HART, supra note 1, at 57–58. 
21. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary
Gregor ed. & trans, Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1785). 
22. See id. at 7.
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implications.  First, what he calls “gifts of nature”e.g., courage and
perseveranceand “gifts of fortune”e.g., power and richeshave no 
“inner unconditional worth,” courage or money can be put to either good
or evil uses.23  Likewise, the effects accomplished through one’s actions,
including those for the sake of which the action is undertaken, are of
themselves neither good nor evil, however desirable or agreeableor their
contrarythey may be.24  A failed attempt to rescue a drowning person is
no less worthy of moral appraisal than a successful attempt, so long as the
rescuer in each situation evinced an equal degree of commitment.25  The
efficacy of one’s actions is a fortuitous matter, foreign to one’s will. 
Satisfied that he has established the will as the bearer of moral value,
Kant proceeds to “explicate the concept of a will that is to be esteemed in 
itself.”26  He turns at this juncture to the concept of duty because “it contains
that of a good will,” by which he means that we rely on assertions about 
duties to issue moral judgments.27 Four options are open to an agent subject
to duty: acting against duty; performing a duty for the sake of another end; 
performing a duty from inclination; and acting from duty.28  Since Kant’s
purpose is to explicate the concept of good will, he quickly sets aside the 
first two.  He says it is “much more difficult,” although critical, to distinguish 
the third and the fourth.  He argues from examples, such as the following: 
[To] preserve one’s life is a duty, and besides everyone has an immediate 
inclination to do so. But on this account the often anxious care that most people
take of it still has no inner worth and their maxim has no moral content. They
look after their lives in conformity with duty but not from duty. On the other 
hand, if adversity and hopeless grief have quite taken away the taste for life; if an
unfortunate man. . .wishes for death and yet preserves his life without loving it, 
not from inclination or fear but from duty, then his maxim has moral content.29 
Kant is not suggesting that there is something reproachable about
having an inclination to survive, or that we have to feel miserable in order 
to be moral.30 His point is that our duty to preserve life is not conditioned 
by our natural inclination to survive; feeling suicidal is never a good
reason for committing suicide. On the contrary, it is precisely when the 
incentives of inclination and duty pull in opposite directions that the
 23. See id. at 7–8. 
24. See id. at 8, 13.
25.  Kant endorses the proverb “the road to hell is paved with good intentions.”  Id. 
at 8.  A good will is an acting will. Id.  “[A good will is] not, of course, a mere wish but 
[a] summoning of all means insofar as they are in our control.” Id.
 26. Id. at 10. 
27. Id.
 28. Id. at 10–11. 
29. Id. at 11. 
30. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Introduction to KANT, supra note 21, at xiii, n.6.
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character of one’s will is tested.  That is why the concept of moral value 
or good will benefits from an analysis of the concept of dutywe understand 
what makes a will good when it resists an inclination to flout duty.
Morality or goodness is the property of a will that is moved to do what is 
right even when that implies acting against inclination.  To have a duty,
therefore, is to have a necessity to actor refrain from actingin certain
ways irrespective of the contingencies of one’s inclination.  Since it is 
characteristic of laws that they are necessarylaw-likeKant defines 
duty as “the necessity of an action from respect for law,” where the law in
question is a law of the will instead of some other type of law, say of logic 
or of nature.31  What he means is that dutythe law of the willis not
conditioned by inclination. 
From his analysis of the concept of good will Kant manages to locate 
the source of moral value in a specific incentive for action distinct from 
and defined by contrast to inclination: respect for law.  Yet the argument
appears to provide no clue as to what is the content of such law. Kant, 
however, takes no further step before asking: “[W]hat kind of law can that 
be, the representation of which must determine the will . . . in order for 
the good to be called good absolutely and without limitation?”32  As the
moral law governs the will irrespective ofand even againstinclination,
Kant sidesteps the inquiry into the content of the law and claims that
morality’s universal form furnishes a test for our maxims of action.
Morality requires that we act from principles the validity of which is not 
borrowed from inclination, that is, unconditioned by our feelings, wishes, 
desires, and the like. That leaves no other option but “the conformity of 
actions as such with universal law.”33 That is, I know if my maxim embodies
a genuine moral duty if I have reason to hold on to it when I abstract from 
my inclinations, i.e. when I will it to become a universal law.  That is the 
only possible basis of morality.
When we make it a maxim to act on some inclinatione.g., I will cheat 
on today’s match in order to win and earn the admiration of my peerswe
make an instrumental use of our reason. There are certain means required
to achieve the proposed end, and reason instructs usin the form of
hypothetical imperativesabout such means.  Moral duties, however, are 
not based on inclination.  They are embodied in maxims that are universally 
31. KANT, supra note 21, at 14. 
32. Id.
 33. Id. 
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valid, meaning that they are valid irrespective ofand even against
one’s inclination. That is why the supreme principle of morality or the moral
law is the categorical imperativeit is not conditioned by the contingencies
of inclination. But what can be the source of an imperative that is valid
universally? Kant argues that it can only be the will or reason in its practical
use, not as an instrument of inclination but as a giver of universal laws.34 
Our moral duties, then, are the ends that reason sets for us, as opposed to 
the ends that stem from inclination and for the sake of which we borrow 
reason’s resources.  The rule of the passions is heteronomous because it
subjects the will to ends external to itself; the rule of morality, on the contrary,
is autonomous, because it is authored by the will.35  A different formulation 
of the categorical imperative is hence: “act only so that the will could regard
itself as at the same time giving universal law through its maxim.”36  In
this way, “the will is not merely subject to the law but subject to it in such
a way that it must be viewed as also giving the law to itself . . . of which it
can regard itself as the author.”37 
Now when a person acts on a maxim that passes the test furnished by 
the formula of the universal law, the end that he seeks is universally valid. 
It is not borrowed from inclination but from practical reason.  That means 
that the person is acting on a principle that is not hers but everyone’s.  In 
a community where every person is a good will, therefore, every individual’s
actions are everyone’s actions, because they are all sanctioned by the
common will.  All that you do to me is just as much a product of my will 
as all that I do myself, for so long as we are moved by respect for the law 
each and every instance of human action is commonly willed. The law
which inspires our actions is authored by us qua free and rational beings. 
That is the ideal community that Kant describes as a “kingdom of ends . . . 
a systematic union of various rational beings through universal laws.”38 
In the kingdom of ends every member is a sovereign lawgiver, for 
everyone’s actions are governed by universal laws.  Yet it is critical that 
we remember Kant’s insistence that goodness is a property of the will.  If 
everyone happens to conform to the moral order but fails to act from duty, 
what appears to be a kingdom of ends is in fact a kingdom of legality.
And just as preserving one’s life from inclination “has no inner worth
and . . . no moral content,” a kingdom of mere legality has no moral worth 
whatsoever.39 Enforcing morality is thus self-defeating. 
34. See id. at 39–40. 
35. Id. at 41. 
36. Id. at 42. 
37. Id. at 39. 
38. Id. at 41. 
39. Id. at 11. Allen Wood writes correctly that: 
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IV. 
Let us now turn to three additional reasons for upholding the HP: self-
government, experimentalism, and individualism.  I shall examine each of 
them in turn. 
Self-government.  Paternalism is often premised on the idea that ordinary
people, while naturally endowed with the rational and volitional capacities 
required to form and execute a worthy life plan, more or less systematically
fail to put such capacities to use.  If they are left to their own devices, they 
will exhibit a wide range of deliberative pathologies, such as laziness,
cowardice, recklessness, profligacy, gluttony, lust, envy, wrath, selfishness, 
and many other vices that lead to actions that may not be perilous to others 
but are usually harmful to the agent.  Human beings, on this view, are 
naturally prone to make bad decisions, either because they do not always
subject their actions to rational scrutiny or because they are liable to suffer
from akrasiaweakness of the will.40 The law may assist them in pursuing 
what is good for them, preventing or at least discouraging bad choices,
that may be achieved through a variety of means, ranging from the old-fashioned
“repression of vice” through criminal law to the “architecture of choice” 
through regulations that nudge people in the supposedly right direction
say, setting up the default baseline to increase the likelihood that people 
will save enough money for retirement or avoid the consumption of
unhealthy foods.41 
It cannot be denied that people occasionally make bad choices by their 
own reasoned criteria of goodness, and that some people are or let themselves
become systematically poor choosers.  But I think that those of us who 
Kantian morality . . . is never about the social regulation of individual conduct. 
It is entirely about enlightened individuals autonomously directing their own
lives . . .  From a Kantian standpoint, any use whatever of social coercion in any
form to enforce ethical duties . . . must be regarded as a wrongful violation of
individual freedom by corrupt social customs. 
Allen Wood, The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy, 306 SOUTHERN J. PHIL. 1, 9 
(1997).
I do not think this is true of Kantian morality onlyKant’s points about the nature of moral
value seem to me valid for any morality that is worth taking seriously philosophically,
whether or not his views about morality’s sourcepractical reasonand contentthe
categorical imperativeare to be accepted.
40. See CHRISTOPHER BOBONICH & PIERRE DESTREE, Introduction to AKRASIA IN GREEK 
PHILOSOPHY xv (2007). 
41. See RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS passim (2008). 
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believe in democratic governance are necessarily committed to two further 
propositions that greatly mitigate such concerns: that most people are able 
to make reasonable choices on most occasions and that it is unnecessary
and inappropriate to restrain or manipulate people’s choices.
If we are committed to democracy, we must believe that ordinary people
who vote for their representatives in elections or for particular policy options 
in referendums are normally capable of forming and acting upon reasonable
judgements; democratic governance presupposes a large measure of confidence 
in the deliberative capacity and discipline of the addressees of the law, 
since they are ultimately the law’s authors.  There is something slightly odd
about paternalist legislation in a democracy, since those who sponsor it 
are not shepherding but representing the people, and will have to answer
before it for their decisions.  Of course, we might argue that democratic
accountability is precisely what makes such laws legitimate, since ordinary 
people are given a chance to judge whether they are in fact good for them 
or not. But that argument only works for piecemeal proposals of paternalism
meant to target the most serious and undisputed cases of poor choice; if
paternalist reasons become commonplace grounds of legal control, the
whole apparatus of representation and accountability in which democracy
is grounded is brought to disrepute.  Ordinary people cannot consistently
be regarded as both poor choosers and disciplined voters. 
In fact, the association of individual freedom with collective self-government 
is even closer. Democratic legitimacy rests on the political equality of the 
citizens, the notion that each of them should have an equal say in issues
concerning their life in common; “one person, one vote” expresses the
equal worth of their opinions.  But what makes majority rule necessary is
the fact that in other-regarding areas of human action we cannot allow 
each person the perfectly self-governing path of following her own opinion— 
collective action is indispensable if we wish to avoid the injustice and 
inefficiency of social chaos.42 In self-regarding areas, however, there is no 
need for collective action, no demand placed upon the people that they
fashion a single decision from the plurality of opinions that flourish amongst 
them; on the contrary, in such matters democracy can give way to the 
purest form of self-government embodied in the unrestrained exercise of
individual freedom.43  Any attempt to divert the resources of democratic 
42. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 101–03 (1999). 
43. See MILL, supra note 4, at 8.  In the words of Jurgen Habermas, “individual
freedom and collective self-government are ‘co-original’ values.”  JÜRGEN HABERMAS,
FAKTIZITÄT UND GELTUNG: BEITRÄGE ZUR DISKURSTHEORIE DES RECHTS UND DES
DEMOKRATISCHEN RECHTSSTAATS 134–35 (1998). 
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governance towards the regulation of self-regarding conduct should thus 
be regarded with apprehension and mistrust.44 
Still, no amount of confidence in the self-discipline of voters and no 
awareness of the necessary bond between democracy and freedom will
shove away the evidence of notoriously bad choices and lifestyles, those 
“things which have been tried and condemned from the beginning of the 
world.”45  And there is now a large literature in behavioral economics and 
social psychology teaching us how and where we fail miserably at the task 
of making rational decisions.  But there is a big difference between informing 
people about their decisional biases and flaws or educating them to become
more conscious and disciplined decision-makers, and coercing, manipulating, 
or just nudging them. Denying the deliberative potential of ordinary people, their 
ability to improve the mastery over the passions and environments that corrupt 
disciplined decision-making, and rushing to repress their bad choices or 
taking advantage of their biases to promote their own well-being, seems hardly 
befitting of their dignity as choosers—their worth as rational beings.46 
Experimentalism. Mill argues for freedom of expression on what we 
might call—following Karl Popper—“fallibilist” grounds, namely that
free and open discussion of our opinions, including those that are widely,
sincerely, and passionately held, is the very condition which makes them
reasonable and worthy of our allegiance.47  Our beliefs are justified to the
extent that they survive the challenge mounted by those who oppose them 
in debate—insofar, therefore, as they have not yet been refuted.  Far from 
being a nuisance or a threat to ourselves, those who disagree with us and 
who put our convictions to trial are to be shown appreciation for their 
contribution to our intellectual development.  He writes that “[i]f all mankind 
minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary
opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, 
than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.”48 
The point here is not that freedom of expression is so valuable to the
44. No doubt that is why Mill begins his essay with cautionary words about the dangers 
that popular government may represent for individual freedom, going as far as invoking
Alexis de Tocqueville’s admonitions against “the tyranny of the majority.”  See  MILL, 
supra note 4, at 6–11. 
45. Id. at 89. 
46. See Jeremy Waldron, It’s All for Your Own Good, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 9,
2014) http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/10/09/cass-sunstein-its-all-your-own-good/
[https://perma.cc/B5WS-KZPG].
47. MILL, supra note 4, at 24. 
48. Id. at 21. 
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individual that it balances off the inconvenience it may represent for those,
however numerous, who dislike or are distressed by opinions contrary to 
their own.  Mill’s claim is that being challenged in our beliefs and feeling 
compelled to argue for our convictions is always a benefit to us because 
it contributes to intellectual progress one way or another. Either our
opinions prevail in debate, in which case defending them reinforces our 
conviction in their truth; or our opinions are refuted, in which case failing 
to uphold them allows us to recognize their falsehood; or our opinions are 
partly true, and it is by confronting them with other partly true opinions 
that we are given a chance to improve our understanding of the issues under
discussion.49  The importance of unimpeded confrontation of ideas is so 
vital in the quest for truth that Mill would want us to manufacture it in
areas where public opinion has evolved towards a consensus.50 
The benefits of vigorous intellectual exchange are, however, not limited
to the selection of true beliefs and the eradication of error.  Mill stresses 
that there is a wide gap between holding a true belief and being in possession 
of a truth; the latter requires an understanding of the meaning and the
grounds of the proposition expressing it. It is one thing to be able to regurgitate 
from memory the multiplication table and quite another to understand the
meaning of each multiplication operation and the arithmetic grounds upon 
which they rest.  Mill is concerned that intellectual complacency and social 
conformism will lead to opinions being “held as a dead dogma,” debasing
even the most justified beliefs to the point of becoming “one superstition 
the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth.”51 
The possession of truth requires the sort of mental alertness and intellectual 
energy that can only be triggered by having our opinions openly, continuously,
and fiercely challenged, preventing their severance from the “inner life of 
the human being.”52 
But Mill is not satisfied that there is ample room for people to nurture 
and confront their opinions.  He insists that they should be allowed the 
freedom to put their opinions to practice, to try and experience the lifestyles
which such opinions support.  His attitude on this point is experimentalist:
he believes that we can only know what is right and good if we try our 
opinions in the court of practice and observation.  He writes: “As it is useful
that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is 
it that there should be different experiments of living . . . and that the worth
of different modes of life should be proved practically, when anyone 
49. Id. at 59. 
50. Id. at 49–50. 
51. Id. at 40–41. 
52. Id. at 46. 
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thinks fit to try them.”53  Experiencing alternatives and observing the like
experiments of others provides empirical vindication for our practical 
judgments.  Again, the point is valid even if there is little doubt that some 
choices are bad; it is by confronting the misery into which “gambling, or 
drunkenness, or incontinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness” leads that we 
renew our understanding and appreciation of the self-restraint that otherwise 
may strike us as an unnecessary deprivation of pleasure and fun.54 We 
owe those who furnish us with examples of eccentric behavior and even
moral debasement every bit as much as we owe those whose opinions are 
unmeritorious for allowing us to reinforce the ground where we stand.55 
Just as freedom of speech is the basis of our intellectual development, freedom
of action is the cornerstone of our ethical flourishment. 
Individualism.  Mill also points our attention to the link between goodness
and individuality.  What is good for one person is not necessarily good for
another, and what is good for most is not necessarily good for all. He is 
skeptical of the view, held by Aristotle and those who followed in his footsteps,
that there is a single form of good life grounded in the specific nature of 
human beings as rational animals.  His view, closely allied to the liberal 
romanticism of Wilhelm von Humboldt and J. W. Goethe, is that the greater
the degree of intellectual development and the wider the range of experience 
of human beings, the more they will seek those goods which express their 
different individualities.56  The emphasis is on the growth of individual
diversity from the common basis of the species: “[h]uman nature is not a
machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed 
for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, 
according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living 
thing.”57  For individuality to express itself, for each person to develop the 
attributes of human nature that are peculiarly hers, there has to be freedom
of action; democratic laws that meddle with the self-regarding area of
human life sacrifice singularity, character, and eccentricity on the altar of
mainstream opinion: “[t]o give any fair play to the nature of each, it is
essential that different persons should be allowed to lead different lives.”58
 53. Id. at 62. 
54. Id. at 89. 
55. Id. at 71–74. 
56. See John Gray, Introduction to MILL, supra note 4, at xiv–xv. 
57. MILL, supra note 4, at 66. 
58. Id. at 70. Mill’s critique of social moralism through custom is particularly
vitriolic here, and borders on self-presumptuous elitism; he disparages the “tyranny of 
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Perhaps Mill goes a little too far in making an argument out of his overt 
romance with the individual.  But his words convey a fair warning against 
the danger of majorities and their representatives using the legislative
process to express prejudice and bigotry, and of them not even realizing 
it. We are prone to confuse what is normal in the strictly empirical sense
of frequent with what is normal in the normative sense of right.
V. 
I have argued that the HP is grounded not in a single ground but in a 
plurality or coalition of partly overlapping and partly complementary grounds, 
namely equal respect, moral worth, self-government, experimentalism, and
individualism.  I do not deny the possibility that even adding all of these 
up there might be tiny interstices left in the area covered by the principle;
I meant to make a general case for the HP, not to answer the challenge of 
a moralist lawmaker wearing a magnifying glass. 
But I want to deal briefly with the more serious challenge posed by those
who claim that the HP is an empty formula because no acts are strictly self-
regarding, except the most morally trivial and politically insignificant— 
say, brushing one’s teeth with whitening toothpaste or ordering one’s steak 
medium-rare.  Even decisions that on the surface appear to fall squarely within
the range of self-regarding behavior, namely those pertaining to one’s religious 
or sexual practices, turn out to be socially relevant once account is taken 
of the distress and revulsion that people of mainstream sensibility experience
when they witness the public exhibition of deviant lifestyles or are simply 
aware of their existence.  Other seemingly private choices, such as the idleness 
of a talented individual who deprives the community from the advantages 
of his productive potential, the smoking habit of a patient of the public
health service, or the decision not to procreate of a couple in a society with 
a low birth rate, have an adverse impact on other people, such that it would 
be question-begging not to count them as “harms.”  In fact, virtually no act in
the territory disputed between moralists and liberals fulfills unequivocally 
the requirements of the HP, which leads us to the bizarre and sinister
conclusion that on Mill’s own grounds there is no limit to the “authority
opinion,” and the “despotism of custom,” and writes, conceivably in a self-regarding spirit:
“Genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom.” Id. at 74, 78. “Persons of
genius are, ex vi termini, more individual than any other people—less capable, consequently, 
of fitting themselves, without hurtful compression, into any of the small number of moulds 
which society provides in order to save its members the trouble of forming their own character.”
Id. at 72. 
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of society” over the individual.  Critics of the HP have often relied on this 
argument to discredit it as incoherent and useless.59 
The criticism is nevertheless misguided in two important ways. First, 
it is based on a misunderstanding of the principle.  The HP does not offer 
a complete account of legitimate legal control; the other-regarding nature
of an act is not a sufficient warrant for collective interference with individual 
choices, requiring as well a judgment balancing the reasons for and against 
it.  The weight of the social interests endangered or compromised by the 
exercise of individual liberty must be such as to justify the legal restriction 
of the latter.60 In sum, the HP merely establishes a necessary condition 
for the legitimacy of restrictive laws: the acts subject to legal control must
be other-regarding. Moreover, the principle does not really concern the
selection of acts or behaviors, but of the reasons which may be legitimately
offered to support restrictive laws.  Accordingly, while it does not absolutely
rule out public control over eating habits, professional decisions, sexual 
behavior, religious practices, and other choices that are generally regarded 
as private, the HP filters paternalist and moralist motives out of the set
of reasons offered in support of those measures, weakening considerably 
the case for them.  In practice, then, there is a significant domain of human
behavior insulated by the principle from legal interference—and that is 
how we should interpret references by Mill and other liberals to a non-trivial
category of self-regarding acts.
A second error of the critics concerns the interpretation of “harm.”  It is
often assumed that the HP deploys a naturalist or “value-neutral” concept
of harm, defined as any inconvenience or disadvantage incurred by at least 
one person according to that person’s own criteria of well-being. Under
such a broad account of harm, there is no doubt that the HP ends up doing
very little of the filtering function that it is supposed to serve; moral distress,
for instance, including the bare knowledge––or even the suspicion––that 
other people have lifestyles that one disapproves of very strongly, will 
have to be counted as a harm.  These worries have led many advocates of
the HP to substitute far more complex notions—such as “individual rights”
and “basic interests”—for the concept of harm, apparently unaware of the 
self-defeating character of the move: the HP furnishes the criterion to 
determine what rights individuals have or what interests are worthy of legal 
59. See, e.g., Bernard Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999).
60. MILL, supra note 4, at 16. 
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protection, such that relying on these to define harm embodies a vicious 
circularity and the inevitable downfall of Mill’s project of asserting “one 
very simple principle . . . to govern absolutely the dealings of society with
the individual.”61  The obvious alternative is to understand Mill’s concept 
of harm in light of his overall argument for individual freedom.  As Jeremy
Waldron puts it: 
The problem of whether moral distress should be regarded as harm for the 
purposes of Mill’s principle is not one that can be resolved by a logical analysis
of the concept of harm or by looking up ‘harm’ in the dictionary . . . Once we are 
faced . . .with rival conceptions of harm, the question is then not what ‘harm’
really means, but what reasons of principle there are for preferring one conception
to another in the present context . . . [T]he question is . . . which conception answers
more adequately to the purposes for which the concept is deployed. In the context 
of On Liberty, those purposes are established by Mill’s arguments for freedom of
opinion and lifestyle, that is, by his account of what we have to lose if liberty in
those areas is withheld.62 
Now if we approach the problem of moral distress from the angle of 
Mill’s experimentalist defense of freedom, there cannot be any doubt that
he did not regard it as a harm but indeed as a good.63 It is not enough to
assert, as H.L.A. Hart does, that “a right to be protected from the distress
which is inseparable from the bare knowledge that others are acting in 
ways you think wrong, cannot be acknowledged by anyone who recognizes
individual liberty as a value.”64  That begs the question of the value of 
liberty. As we have seen, confronting rival, even eccentric, opinions and
lifestyles, and feeling pushed by them to argue for and find the meaning 
in those that are conventional, is for Mill one of the chief reasons to uphold 
the HP. Distress triggers the use of the “mental and moral muscles”
indispensable to the intellectual and moral progress of human beings, and 
is thereby something which society should not seek to control but treasure
and nurture.65
 61. Id. at 13–14.  Mill cannot be wholly exempted from lapsing into that error―
see his musings over “rights” and “interests,” id. at 83–84, and over “assignable obligations,” 
“definite duty,” and “constructive injury,” id. at 90–91. 
 62. Jeremy Waldron, Mill and the Value of Moral Distress, 35 POL. STUD. 410,
413–14 (1987).
63. Id. at 417–18. 
64. See HART, supra note 1, at 46. 
65. See MILL, supra note 4, at 65. 
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